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Discourse about Europe's Others, about "primitive races", about
"Orientals", about Jews, Africans and so-called Negroes is omni
present even in such momentous intellectual undertakings as psycho-
analysis and Marxism. What one encounters are a series of significant
tendencies all amounting to the verbal device through which something
familiar is made to appear strange - 'making strange• as Volosinov
would put it.
If we disregard the earlier claims of scientific racism, and
Poliakov amongst others has demonstrated the abundance of such claims,
we are able to find inscriptions of Otherness in the most unexpected
quarters. Hegel could pronounce and there is no tremor in the voice
whose echo one hears: "The Negro, exhibits the natural man in his
completely wild and untamed state. We must lay aside all thought of
reverence and morality - all that we call feeling - if we would
rightly comprehend him; there is nothing harmonious with humanity to
be found in this type of character .. . They have no knowledge of the
immortality of the soul .. the devouring of human flesh is altogether
consonant with the general principles of the African race."
What a salvo! All the power and authority of recognition is
asserted. To get the full impact of similar ennunciations one leaves
the domain of German philosophy, Europe's cultural narcissism which
contemplated racial and linguistic purity and returns to Freud. Not,
mind you, in the creatively violent fashion in which Lacan returned to
Freud. Hegel we may presume, strayed into unfamiliar territory in
his constitution of the African but his authority is not thereby
reduced by this lapse since apart from having been a member of a
super-ordinate race the authority of his discourse is established by
something beyond a single .utterance - by his work as a whole. Even
in his case, the inscription of the Other is fixed and it feels as
complete and permanent as it could possibly be and, will always be.
But Freud went even further, more so since it was years after the
Interpretation of Dreams. And we encounter him at his most cynical,
if genius can countenance such gestures. It would be error, no: an
illusion to say that Freud was fascinated by the Other, by savages in
outlandish jungles. When he turned his hovering attention to the
question of the Other as he did on a number of occasions it was to
move on to something more momentous than a mere declaration. The
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strokes he uses are bold and firm. Accomplished facts: there is no
room for additional questions. The solemnity of the moment conjures
up damnation and much else.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, it is the concept of "natural
death" which is decidedly foreign to primitive races. Primitive races;
not man. Freud writes approvingly of Le Bon's notion of the
identification of the group mind with that of primitives. It is a
"well justified" conclusion, we are assured. The savage is sponta-
neous, ferocious and violent. And yet, is in some fundamental fashion
not unlike the child or the neurotic. Freud continues his discourse
on primitive races and their similartiy to present-day children in
Moses and Monotheism. It must be remembered that the primal horde
in which the decisive rapture occurred; the act of parricide and the
subsequent development of civilisation and Oedipus complex, was the
scene of lust and bloodthirstiness.
A veritable orgy; not devoid of spectacle. Similarities amongst
primitives, children and neurotics assumed the form of an identity.
They plagued Freud's mind time and time again and he could write: " In
our children, in adults who are neurotic, as well as primitive
peoples, we meet with the mental phenomenon which we describe as a
belief in the 'omnipotence of thought.' In our judgement this lies in
an overestimation of the influence which our mental (in this case
intellectual) acts can exercise in altering the external world. All
the magic of words, too, has its place here, and the conviction of the
power which is bound up with the knowledge and pronouncing a name".
Like most texts, Freud's discourse is plurivocal and there is
sufficient appropriation of the discourses of others such as Le Bon
and McDougall. His intervention undermines the filiation of the dis-
courses of others. He appropriates them and in a most charismatic
fashion, endows them with his own signature. It is not always possible
in Freud's case to ask: "what does it matter who is speaking?" For
in his case, one is entitled to depend on Foucault' s wisdom when he
writes: "The author's name manifests the appearance of a certain
discursive set and indicates the status of discourse within a society
and a culture". And in a different vain, Althusser is utterly,
exacting when he tells us that Freud set up in business: alone.
Freud's approach to the discourse of his predecessors such as Le Bon
and McDougall is not one of recognition but that of appropriation such
that it is little surprise that we encounter lengthy verbatim
quotations.
Freud' s discourse like that of Hegel, Le Bon and McDougall is
intriguing. In each case, we encounter a great amount of narrative
pressure in which epithet after epithet is dislodged as if the
intention were to secure a permanent and irreducible recognition and
constitution of Otherness. And yet, what is more, this tendency
remains evident even in later ethnopsychiatric discourse as we are to
establish later. The inscription of the Blacks, the recognition of
difference which disperses itself in several directions in these dis-
courses is a paradoxical one.
These early inscriptions attempt to harmonise in a single image:
the tantrums of a child, the omnipotence of thought, a passionate
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intensity which knows no limits, as well as the cannibalistic savage
in whom violence, murder and sexual transgressions are but the order
of the day. The paradox: innocence and treachery! But what is even
more important with regard to Freudian discourse and the paradox which
it ennunicates with such recklessness is the other image. I am re-
ferring to the notion, craftly developed to the status of an
explanatory principle; the image of the primal horde and the decisive
act of parricide.
We note a shamelss exuberance as Freud declares in Moses and
Monotheism: "The first decisive step towards a change in this sort of
'social' organization seems to have been that the expelled brothers,
living in a community, united to overpower their father and, as was
the custom in those days, devoured him raw. There is no need to balk
at this cannibalism; it continued far into later times. The essential
point, however, is that we attribute the same emotional attitudes to
these primitive men that we are able to establish by analytical
investigation in the primitives of the present day - in our child-
ren". The recognition is total - closed. There appears to be
nothing else outside this inscription. The opacity has dissipated
and what is left is a declared truth sanctioned by a man who set up
business alone.
It is the dispersion of this discourse in later texts which arouses
our interest. From now on, mankind must recognise the role of
sexuality in social formations. Indeed mankind must recognise murder
and violence as instances with revolutionary possibilities. Power has
come into its own and what is more, from then on the inscription of
Otherness includes an absence of individuality because the subject has
arisen in its place. The black man is constituted individually as
though he was part of a permanent mob. He is, since the connection is
not a difficult one, a group man. Notably, all these inscriptions
which recur in various forms in colonial and related discourses remain
hostage to the "archetype" of the primal horde and its excesses.
Although the transformation of the individual into a subject is now
paramount, the dangecous tendencies are in the domain of sexuality
power and rebellion.
"Lacan's first word is to say: in principle, Freud founded a
science. A new science which was the science of a new object: the
unconscious". Freud's entire discourse, a significant part of it
that is, centred around this new object. But then there was another
founder of discursivity, one who did not pay any significant attention
to the unconscious, to personality, to subjectivity, to "language" as
such: Karl Marx- More optimistic about human nature than Freud, Marx
could contemplate the future of mankind positively: "Marx did, however
consider the mode of existence (culture) more important than
biological essence (nature). One can also see two contrasting sides
to him: the more racist Marx of the letters, where he opened his heart
as a man and a son of his age (in one of his letters he referred to
the 'sexual swinishness of the savages') and the universalistic Marx
of the philosophical and sociological writings, for whom all the
natural differences of the species were to disappear in the socialist
city of the future."
Both Marx and Engels considered 'civilized' man morally and
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intellectually superior to savages and Marx for one is said to have
been anti-Semitic. It would, however, be uncharitable to expect a
man, working as Marx did, with the conceptual categories which
intrigued him to have had more than a passing and disdainful interest
in primitive man. For in a sense, primitive man, unlike the peasantry
and proletariate were not yet on history's conveyor belt. They were
not, so to speak, in the arena of class struggle - they were (out)
side history.
It is the familiarity of what Hegel, Freud and Marx and other
founders of discursivity proclaimed about "people of colour" which
reminds us that through and through they are our contemporaries having
contributed the status of their discourse to the chain of discourse
which is sometimes described as colonial discourse.
II
In the Foreword to Michael Billig's pamphlet on Psychology, Racism &
Fascism, Robert Moore points out that: "Most social scientists regard
scientific racism as dead. But it will not lie down and many believe
that there is some sort of case to answer because the noise continues.
It is not enough for us to effect boredom, and detachment from what in
intellectual terms has become merely irritating, because the political
consequences are real especially when they break through into
'legitimate' politics". For a while X will not be discussing the
varieties of ethnopsychiatric discourse.
I want to draw attention to the contemporary problem of scientific
racism in view of the fact that, the "dispersion" and "circulation" of
its discourse is wide ranging and its linkages are discernible in
South Africa as well, but of that later.
What Billig attempts within the space of a closely argued thirty
nine pages, is to establish whether there are any connections between
"contemporary fascism" and psychological theories of racial diff-
erences in intelligence. Billig begins with a concise but detailed
account of race science in Nazi Germany and singles out the work of,
amongst others, Hans Giinter who believed, inter alia, that an under-
standing of race was a central concern of all the sciences of 'man'.
In fact, Giinter believed that the study oX race was the key to the
understanding of all the human sciences. After the Second World
War, elitist racial theories appeared to have lost their appeal and
this occasions little surprise since Nazism pointed the way to the
outer limits which a crude mixture of racism and fascism can lead to-
Psychologists, like other^scientists and intellectuals, provided much
of the assumed scientific basis of Nazism.
What the expereince of war on a large scale (including genocide on
a large scale) failed to achieve was an enlightened humility and
tolerance for difference. Instead, it was not long before race
science began to rear its head. Old images, cushioned firmly on past
'scientific' discourse reasserted themselves. The primary 'object' of
this postwar discourse, the object that is, of postwar race science
became the problem of differences in intelligence between blacks and
whites. Arthur Jensen introduced the discursive shift when in 1969,
he published an article in The Harvard EducationalReview, entitled
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"How much can we boost I.Q. and scholastic achievement?" "However",
writes Billig, "the effect of Jensen's work on fascist groups
throughout the world was immediate and electric. The fine details of
the various arguments were irrelevant to their purposes: what mattered
was the chance to make race-science respectable once again."
Jensen earned himself the dubious honour of launching racist
science into mainstream psychological discourse. And yet it was
Britain's "most influential psychologist" who appropriated Jensen's
theories. Hans Eysenck, a German by birth wanted this appropriation
to be something more than a. mere declaration of recognition and
support of Jensen's theories. Eysenck's appropriation of Jensen•s
discourse took the form of a book: Race, intelligence and Education.
One of the conclusions to be drawn from Billig's analysis is that
Eysenck's appropriation of Jensen's discourse is not only a matter of
scientific concern for, Eysenck is but one (prominent without doubt)
of a number of American, European and South African intellectuals who
are nurturing racist science and racist culture. None of them is
working in isolation, that is, all the important figures are linked
together in terms of their work through editorships of a specific set
of semi-academic journals. What is striking also is the circulation
internationally of a series of texts which are not only published
through a limited number of fascist journals hilt are appropriated by
fascist groups in Europe and the United States. Most of the journals
identified by Billig have actively promoted the theories of Jensen and
Eysenck. The kinds of questions which Billig's discourse is meant to
answer also show the relationsip between racist science and
contemporary fascism.
The fixity of the representation of the Other (blackness) which
race-science places before our eyes pronounces the genetic inferiority
of blacks particularly with regard to intelligence. The discourse
says: It cannot be helped and no one should fret about it: let it be
so! What makes matters worse is that this intellectual vulnerability
is presumed to be biological thus pushing the discourse beyond the
domain of genetics, evolution and that which is shrouded in mystery:
creation itself. Here too we bear witness to the phenomenon of making
strange, only this time, the discourse is not pressured beyond itself
by a torrent of epithets. The discourse is numerical thus appropriat-
ing unto itself the authority of empirical science. This time, the
black man is not a child, he is not a beast. He is afflicted with a
condition which cannot be alleviated. In short, since he cannot be
helped by anyone, least of all himself in changing his innate genetic
endowment, he is cursed. And since as Foucault has said, "visibili-
ty is a trap", the black man cannot get out of sight, get lost and
give his interlocutor a respite. And so it is that besides Freud,
Marx, Hegel, Jung, Eysenck and Jensen other interventions should be
considered. While the work of Eysenck and Jensen represents part of
the internationalisation of race science there is a well established
tradition of discourse by Euro-American savants concerned with the
broad field of ethnqpsychiatry and what some writers describe as
'African psychology'.
The discourse on the intellectual inferiority of blacks is a re-
splendent inscription (a substitution) proffered by empiricist psycho-
logical science. Sanitised with a bountiful presence of numerical rep-
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resentation, this kind of "science" of the Other fails in its mission
to make us know its object (know in the sense of knowledge). Inferior
to art as it is, it is a discourse whose predominant quality is a
charismatic allusion to its object. It is a discourse which makes
the reader feel and perceive. It offers us decisive conclusions
which are preceeded by tenuous premises and concepts. Looked at in
this light, it could be taken for a perverse aesthetic but since we
are able to discern its ideological underbelly, we are able today to
recognise it for the artifice it really is.
The discourse on intelligence within the colonial and race-
supremacist cultures is a sign (a decisive one no doubt) in a larger
separation of reason (western and white) and unreason (primitive and
black). As a sign, intelligence is not amenable to an arbitrary
separation from a larger net-work of signs, namely those invoking
personality. If the notion of black intellectual inferiority is a
curse in colonial and neo-colonial discourse, the psychological dis-
course on African personality offers no salvation. Ethnopsychiatric
discourse is assertive, and unequivocal in its inscriptions of the
intelligence and personality of the Other, less so than is the case
with the bodjL which, as we know, has been the locus of both discipline
and desire. When we read locutions such as The Mind of Man in
Africa, Mind in the Heart of Darkness, The Pagan Soul and Black Hamlet
to mention the most illustrative instances we experience an uncanny
feeling of being privileged. At the threshold of a discourse these
kinds of locutions are not only devices for making the obj ect of
discourse strange, but allow us to escape momentarily into what Edward
Said describes as radical realism. Should the victim of racism
(whether it be the colonial or Apartheid variety or for that matter
anti-Semitism) succumb to the seduction of this radical realism by
engaging in a lopsided dialogue with the coloniser, the ultimate fate
will be no other than that which Fanon has so forcefully presented to
us in his writings.
Ill
Colonial discourse respects no boundaries, its geography is that of
a limitless terrain and I consider this characteristic so decisive
that I will not bother to introduce conceptual distinctions between
the so-called "African psychology", "Ethnopsychiatry" and "race
science". I find no strategic value for the present analysis in such
distinctions. Small wonder then that I have and will continue to use
these terms as signifiers in a single semantic field.
What about South African Apartheid discourse? As I have pointed
out earlier, the dispersion and circulation of colonial discourse is
such that its terrain is vast such that South Africa is only one of
the strategic locations at its disposal. I prefer, therefore, to
search elsewhere, for another beginning, for locutions which are much
more general - directed as they are to Africans on the African
continent.
Before proceeding, however, I need to clarify much that has been
implicit in my approach to texts. First let me say with Ricoeur that
in the social sciences (including the "dubious science" called
psychiatry) the question relating to interpretation no longer concerns
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that which is veridical but that which can defeat a particular claim
or interpretation. The first important consideration is to make the
text speak; to speak in such a way that the original intentions of the
author pale into insignificance. In a similar vein, one should eschew
the temptation of a psychoanalysis of the author and concentrate
instead on that which is at the vanguard of the text as opposed to
that which is behind or below it. In the case of all discourse, we
are more than entitled to ask: who is speaking and from which
strategic location? And finally, since the text (at the "instance of
discourse") presents us with an entirely novel situation, we need to
interrogate it such that it can create a "world" of discourse unique
because of its referential features.
IV
The colonial discourse on Africa and Africans is a historically
specific one. It will be evident in the course of my discussion that
there are a whole series of texts spanning both the continent and
historical time culminating in the 1980s wit^L the South African
version of colonial discourse called Apartheid. For example, the
work of Professor Porot in Algeria antedates that of J.C, Carothers.
But of the two, Carothers is the more significant due to the role
which his .work has continued to play in colonial ethnopsychiatric
discourse.
The psychology of Mau Mau: that is the object of Carothers1 dis-
course, the object of his science. On the one hand is psychology - a
promise of scientific understanding and on the other, the Mau Mau
conjuring up images of savages in revolt reminiscent no doubt of
Freud's primal horde. Further still: canabilistic orgies in a prime-
val jungle. Carothers is privileged both professionally and in terms
of the company he keeps (the WHO and later, the British Colonial
Office). Because of this strategic location in his texts, he cannot
but produce a discourse which is plurivocal. So you and I are expect-
ed to feel privileged since by reading his texts we too will be
keeping "good company" (incidentally a favourite phrase of his). But
one must remember that because of his strategic location in his texts
he could count on the power of those who were to be the original
recipients of his discourse.
I will be brief. Although his mind is made, although the fundamen-
tal inscriptions are present at the outset of his discourse, the
ritual must take its course. Thus it is that questions of climate,
(forests and temperature), nutrition, physical illness (infections
...) and culture have a prominence in the texts which are superfluous
if considered in relation to the representation of either the Mau Mau
in Kenya or Africans in general.
The African underemploys the frontal lobes which is notable as a
form of cortical sluggishness. He is a character of extremes who is
guided by emotion rather than insight. He is prone to extreme violent
acts and has a low frustration tolerance level. Carothers' African
thinks like a child and is characterised by a tenuous sense of
security. What is more, he displays an inability for synthesis. Again
we are face to face with the "child" who kills, with the mysteries of
Creation and with a universe in which the coloniser is absent or
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silent. Only the African's culture and his geographical location
count for is it not true that "studies of culture are, in fact studies
of psychology?" This absence of the coloniser is intriguing and it is
one of the more fundamental inscriptions in Carothers' discourse. It
is a silence of the powerful and who should dare to disturb it?
In The Mind of Man in Africa we find Carothers moving from one
strategic location to another, in each case, in a desperate attempt to
"know" his object, to produce scientific discourse. He achieves this
aim in two questionable ways. The first is represented by a distress-
ing reliance on esoteric and archaic texts. A more sinister element
in his discourse is keeping what he calls "good company". It is not
difficult to show that Carothers was not keeping good company at all
except if it can be assumed he two was a conscious promoter of race
science like Eysenck and Jensen.
Carothers admires Eysenck, Shuey, McGurk, J.D.J. Hofmeyer and of
course Africa's most "prominent" Psychologist, Simon Biesheuevel. A
link with race science and with individuals connected with fascist
journals like The Mankind Quarterley may be difficult to substantiate
but the tendency on Carothers' part must be recognised for what it is.
It is the South African connection, however, which is intellectually
more sinister. Social science discourses about the Blacks in South
Africa and discourses about Black Americans should never be taken at
face value and yet we find Carothers appropriating these discourses,
without question. Biesheuevel, Hofmeyer, Eysenck, McGurk, Shuey,
Carothers says: if you had not spoken I would speak.
The dispersion of South African psychological discourse in The Mind
of Man in Africa achieves significance if we consider a number of
scenarios. In the first instance, since 1948 when the National Party
assumed power it refined to a fine art the techniques of ideological
control of the country's black majority. South Africa was also poised
after the second world war to become a major outpost of capitalism
such as she has become today.
It was also about this time that Simon Biesheuevel became Director
of the National Institute for Personnel Research (NIPR). The
appointment of Biesheuevel and the establishment of the NIPR was to
have far-reaching consequences not only on the contours of the
political economy of South Africa but led also to the international-
isation of South African psychological discourse coming from the very
heart of the Apartheid society. Small wonder then that Carothers
busks so much on the "good company" he keeps in his most recent
discourse.
As recently as 1981, Bulhan was able to demonstrate the penetration
of South African psychological discoures as well as the methods of
psychological testing devised by the NIPR. Tests for the selection of
African workers developed at the NIPR spread into several English
speaking countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Zambia with the
net result that thousands of African workers through a significant
part of English speaking Afric^ have been subjected to selection
procedures developed at the NIPR.
What kind of African psychological discourse was being appropriated
by Euro-American psychologists, near-psychologists and psychiatrists
like Carothers? Bulhan has identified a number of telling statements
attributed to Biesheuevel, Statements which are a pointer to in-
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scriptions of blackness which Biesheuvel patronisingly offered to
South African ideologues, mining magnates and international race
science. One day Biesheuevel will say he was betrayed by the
written word, that the meanings we attach to his discourse are
fabrications and that as a scientist he remained "objective" ...
In his 1958 paper on "Objectives and Methods in African psy-
chological research" published in the Journal of Social Psychology
Biesheuevel, encouraged no doubt by his national and international
reputation, could tell the world what the ground rules in "African
psychological research" are. These ground rules, the bottomline as it
were, Biesheuevel stated along the following lines. The aims of
African psychological research must include: (1) "to gain an under-
standing of the behaviour of African peoples"; (2) "to provide means
of testing the general validity of psychological hypothesis concerning
human behaviour" and finally (3) "to determine the extent to which
(the African's behaviour) is modifiable".
As is often the case, Biesheuevel recognises difference, a diff-
erence of the Other which must be subjected to the gaze of "African
psychological" science in order that the opacity of Africans must be
substituted by a permanent transparency. This would then become a new
kind of visibility of the Other, a visibility that would no longer be
mediated only by the body's blackness (the sociological schema of the
body) but by the special peculiarity of the black psyche.
The "understanding of the behaviour of African peoples" is not
disciplined curiosity. It is an understanding in the service of
ideology: one which must maximise the opportunities for surveillance,
discipline and social control. African psychological research must
indicate the degree to which the behaviour of the Other can be
"modified" to serve the interests of the powers.
Like race science, Biesheuevel's African psychological research
selects for itself a space, a strategic location from which it can
help in the reproduction of relations of racial and class domination
in South African society.
The racist tendencies in this type of discourse should not surprise
us. What should surprise us is the wholescale appropriation of this
discourse together with its technologies (psychological tests) by
Euro-American psychologists and psychiatrists such as Carothers.
Described as a "distinguished psychiatrist" and a man with connections
at high places, Carothers' discourse is an important link in the
dispersion of ethnopsychiatric discourse about Africans and Afro-
Americans. Having said that, I should add that like the South African
psychologist De Ridder, whose discourse I consider a little later,
Carother's representation of Africans includes a neurotic disposition
in which anxiety and insecurity are paramount. So it can be seen that
beginning with Freud, the inscriptions, child, neurotic are not only
fundamental to the discourse about Africans but are part of a net-work
of signifiers that "radical realism" has appropriated for itself.
V
Since the text of Mannoni's discourse, Prospero and Caliban has been
the subject of much discussion, a passing reference should suffice.
We have noticed how in Carothers' discourse the coloniser is either
Making. S&iang.e 10
absent or arrogantly silent. In Mannoni's case, however, the coloniser
is not only present but, what is more, he is a powerful presence
requiring immediate recognition. "In short, then", Mannoni says,
"what I want the reader to realize is that a colonial situation is
created so to speak, the very instant a white man, even if he is
alone, appears in the midst of a tribe, even if it is independent, so
long as he is thought to be rich or powerful or merely immune to the
local forces of magic, and so long as he derives from his position,
even though Oflly in his most secret self, a feeling of his own
superiority".
Both coloniser and colonised are trapped since the colonial
relationship is prefigured in the historical circumstances which have
led to inferiority (white, western) and dependency (black, prelit-
erate) as communal personality types. The sense of inevitability of
the colonial relationship, coupled with its "unrealistic", "emotional"
and "neurotic" character presents us with a psychoanalytic diagnosis,
the treatment of which even Freud could not have readily contemplated.
Mannoni assures us: neither the coloniser nor the victim are to blame
for this complicated state of affairs which leads to colonial racism
and exploitation. So, although Mannoni tried to bring in the
coloniser into his discourse; to accord him sufficient recognition as
an angle from which to contemplate Otherness, it is the former's
unconscious which remains the motive force. All other expressions of
white power, military, economic and political are subject to the
primacy of the unconscious. No other forms of response by the
colonised are contemplated. Neither are they permissable since only a
response at the level of a deep structure is all that the unconscious
and the colonial situation will countenance. Here again, as elsewhere
in colonial discourse, is the ubiquitous impulse for the medical-
isation of the inscription of Otherness (in terms of psychopathology)
only this time, the coloniser occupies a space.
Nevertheless, psychoanalytic theory and practice produced other
discourses about Africans apart from Mannoni•s text. One such a
remarkable text was produced in South Africa ont year before the
historic victory of the Nationalist party in 1948. The very first
paragraph of Wulf Sachs' Black Hamlet tells us that part of the
discourse we are about to hear is familiar. It reads as follows: "He
had lived in South Africa all his life. 'So1, he said to me, 'you are
going to settle in Johannesburg. Well - here's the best advice I can
give you. Leave your ideas in Europe. You're going among blacks -
gentle, happy savages - children, children who never grow beyond the
age of ten or twelve. So,5jf you have any notion of treating them as
equals, forget about it"1.
This is an utterance of a white South African before 1948. From
what we know, neither is it an utterance from one who speaks as a
scientist should speak. Yet, what strikes us is the authoritative
manner in which the utterance is made as well as its proximity to
inscriptions of Africans found in Ethnopsychiatry and "African"
psychological discourse. By the 1920s and 1930s, much of the "scien-
tific" discourse about Africans had become part of the white people's
folk wisdom. Wulf Sachs uncouples himself from this folk wisdom at
the very outset of his discourse. He was intent ori exploiting the
potential of the psychoanalytic situation to the full. The most re-
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markable aspect of the "psychoanalytic" story of the traditional
healer-in-waiting, John Chavambira is not so much that a semi-literate
African can survive the rigorous demands,, of daily one hour sessions
for a period of a little over two years. It is rather that Sachs1
text is an early instance of what we could in todays' terminology
describe as psychobiography: a type of psychohistorical discourse.
It is not as if Wulf Sachs ignored the fundamental rule of psycho-
analysis. Neither did he fail to explore dreams, resistance and
transference when occasions presented themselves. But Sachs did more:
he transgressed some important psychoanalytic prohibitions.
His relationship with John Chavambira continued outside the fifty
minute hour such that the imperative demand for abstinence was
violated, Sachs and Chavambira engaged in a long process of mutual
self-enrichment in a situation in which inter-racial mistrust was
rife. The outcome is a text about Wulf Sachs and John Chavambira
together and separately - What is more, it is a discourse about
traditional Africa, about psychoanalytic discourse and about the
social history of early Johannesburg in the 1920s and the 1930s. It is
a discourse about slum life in Swartyard, Sophiatown and other early
Johannesburg ghettoes. In short, it is not one man's story. It is a
story of a people's despair under blatant white oppression and the
stirrings of resistance and revolt- That which John Chavambira
achieves for himself in terms of his limited understanding of the
political situation; sustaining his ancestoral beliefs and joining and
organising political resistance in the same breath is symbolic of the
African peoples capacity for political struggle. The constitutive
elements in Wulf Sachs1 discourse on Africans departs in important
respects from what we have noted with regard to ethnopsychiatry,
African psychological research and race science. This time, even the
semi-literate African is a man and political and economic factors are
given an importance in the discourse which is often missing in the
texts and discourses we have considered thus far.
Black Hamlet deserves closer study as an example of South African
pre-Apartheid discourse about Africans and their political and eco-
nomic circumstances before 1948. However, even though I have already
referred to Biesheuevel's work most of which, it must be remembered,
is post-1948, I need to consider, in some detail a later example of
South African psychological discourse to suggest the continuities in
the psychological representations of Otherness. If Biesheuevel con-
cerned himself with questions relating to African psychological
research in general and its internationalisation, a contemporary
Johannesburg psychologist set himself a much more ambitious task,
namely to "bridge the gap between opinions-,-and facts" about the
personality of urban Africans in South Africa.
His research sponsors, he tells us were Shell South Africa and
PUTCO Operating the Technical Services. Lest we should, in the end,
doubt his conclusions the usual technical assurances about sample size
and so on are provided. And indeed, difference between the blacks and
the whites have to be established at the outset and De Ridder' s
solution is a description in full measure of the African's "tribal"
and "urban" environments. For him, culture constitutes the ruyal road
to the understanding of difference and his indebtedness to the earlier
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work of C,ar others is evident in the preliminary strategies of his
discourse.
De Ridder cannot be accused of superficiality. Apart from his
dependence on psychoanalytic metapsychology he chose a modified
version of a depth technique, the well known Thematic Apperception
Test. The x-ray of the African psyche, the unconscious which delivers
itself to us as narrative is copiously presented throughout the text
and at last we encounter what De Ridder constitutes as the personality
of the urban African.
What are the cardinal inscriptions of the African which this
particular discourse displays? In the urban African, anxiety and in-
security are endemic. The personality of the urban African is
dominated by the Id - which is to say, by the most 'primitive' and
pleasure seeking system in the entire personality matrix as formulated
by Freudian theory. Africans suffer from a lack of emotional con-
trol (underdeveloped_Ego, super-ego?) and "as a group appear to be an
aggressive people".
The urban African's motivation occasions surprise since it is so
"personally biased" and directed at the acquisition of wealth. After
proclaiming the existence of moral laxity among urban Africans De
Ridder sums up his perception by describing the relationship between
males and females as one "characterised by an almost animal-like
primitivism". Once more, this propensity is ascribed to "weak ego
controls," and the preponderance of Id dominated behaviours. An aside
of immense importance in the recognition of blacks says: the black
man's approach to women is aggressive and one wonders what else lies
beneath this metaphorical type of discourse. An aggressive sexual
approach with its allusions to penetration and potency, coupled with
the Africans "immature exhibitionism" conjures up images of danger.
But as I pointed out earlier, this type of imagery in psychological
discourse about Africans is part of the elaboration of the
psychoanalytic myth of the origins of the social organisation of
society.
Here too, as in some earlier examples, one is made to feel,
perceive and not to know the African. And here too, in the early
1960s, the African is still a child who is not only sexually potent
and mischievous but is also prone to violence, Immature, anxious,
insecure and naively exhibitionistic: is he not an inadequate perso-
nality or, worse still, simply neurotic as has often been suggested?
De Ridderrs preference for "facts" over "opinions" about the
Africans "communal" personality characteristics is not sustained by a
devotion to science. He says this much in a statement tagged away on
page 170: "The urban areas are the African political melting-pots of
the union, and the type of personality emerging from this cultural
cauldron is of political and economic interest,* as well as being of
psychological and sociological significance". Political and eco-
nomic interests are primary and the social science significance of
understanding and constituting the African personality in this fashion
is secondary. And here too, the white man and his political, economic
and military power is absent. The African must be understood in terms
of his culture and the conditions of violence and poverty with which
he has surrounded himself.
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It is worthy of note that De Ridder's discourse makes greater
claims than those which are associated with discrete psychological
processes such as abilities and aptitudes. Its aim is a total rep-
resentation which takes aspects such as intelligence and aptitudes for
granted. Beyond this, is the fact that the decade of 1960s was not
only one of unprecedented economic growth but it was also a period
during which black resistance to apartheid was escalating. In a con-
text such as this, the "political economy of truth" (Foucault) becomes
of more than usual significance.
The problematic surrounding discourses about the blacks boils down
to considerations regarding the manner in which discourses of the kind
discussed in this paper circulate within the social body {the
economic, political and cultural spheres) as well as their elevation
to the status of truth and the reign of "opinion". Amid many state-
ments which could be cited, it seems to me that one can summarise the
consequences of psychological discourses by quoting Foucault when he
says: "This reign of 'opinion', so often invoked at this time,
represents a mode of operation through which power will be exercised
by virtue of the mere fact of things being known and people seen in a
sort of immediate, collective and anonymous gaze. A form of power
whose main instance is that of opinion will refuse to tolerate areas
of darkness".
We would be naive if we thought that the discourses of enthnopsy-
chiatry, race-science and African psychological research have not been
appropriated by Apartheid ideologues for their own purposes. What
more rational legitimation of racial discrimination, segregation and
domination of blacks could one need beyond the limits of "scientific"
discourse? The potential uses of this kind of "truth", this
"knowledge" of the African as childlike, as innately inferior, as
dangerous sexually and as a violent being, and a neurotic to make
matters worse must surely have had a role to play in the various
strategies of white power: separate education, residential segregation,
exclusion of blacks from the exercise of political power, exploitation
of African labour and the absence of equal economic opportunities.
Various ideological state apparatuses came into being to circulate the
effects of this knowledge in the educational domain as well as the
media. And in the circumstances, Aime Cesaire is talking for all of
us when he writes:
"I am talking of millions of men who have been skillfully
injected with fear, inferiority complexes, trepidation,
servility, despair,' abasement".
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